Election Law: Volume 2

THIS CASEBOOK contains a selection of U. S. Court of Appeals decisions that analyze and discuss issues surrounding election law. Volume 2 of the casebook covers the Sixth through the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. * * * [W]hen a "plaintiff alleges that a state has burdened voting rights through the disparate treatment of voters," [ ] precedent requires us to apply the Anderson-Burdick framework. Obama for Am. v. Husted, 697 F.3d 423, 429 (6th Cir. 2012).Under Anderson-Burdick, we first look to the burden the State's regulation imposes on the right to vote. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434, 112 S.Ct. 2059; Obama for Am., 697 F.3d at 428. When States impose "'reasonable nondiscriminatory restrictions'" on the right to vote, courts apply rational basis review and "'the State's important regulatory interests are generally sufficient to justify' the restrictions." Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434, 112 S.Ct. 2059 (quoting Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780, 788, 103 S.Ct. 1564, 75 L.Ed.2d 547 (1983)); see Obama for Am., 697 F.3d at 429. But when States impose severe restrictions on the right to vote, such as poll taxes or limiting access to the ballot, strict scrutiny applies. Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434, 112 S.Ct. 2059 (citing Norman v. Reed, 502 U.S. 279, 289, 112 S.Ct. 698, 116 L.Ed.2d 711 (1992)); Obama for Am., 697 F.3d at 429. It is when cases fall between these two extremes that the Anderson-Burdick framework departs from the traditional tiers of scrutiny and creates its own test.For these intermediate cases, where the burden on the right to vote is moderate, we must weigh that burden against "'the precise interests put forward by the State as justifications for the burden imposed by its rule,' taking into consideration 'the extent to which those interests make it necessary to burden the plaintiff's rights.'" Burdick, 504 U.S. at 434, 112 S.Ct. 2059 (quoting Anderson, 460 U.S. at 789, 103 S.Ct. 1564). Only where the State's interests outweigh the burden on the plaintiff's right to vote do voting restrictions not offend the Equal Protection Clause. Obama for Am., 697 F.3d at 433. While this standard is flexible, we must ultimately "make the 'hard judgment' that our adversary system demands." Crawford, 553 U.S. at 190, 128 S.Ct. 1610 (Stevens, J., announcing the judgment of the Court). Mays v. LaRose, 951 F. 3d 775 (6th Cir. 2020)